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work-app/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-01-work-app-design.md
T
Vincent f057268103 Prove cookie injection lands, rather than assuming it
setCookie is fire-and-forget, so the import's count was what WebKit was
handed, not what it kept. A probe from inside the page reads back the
other end: pairing against Arc gave `names=tz,cids,frontend_lang` for
aputure.odoo.com, and `tz` exists only in Arc's store — so the import
demonstrably landed.

The sites still ask for sign-in. That is the far end refusing the
session, not a broken import, and the two are now distinguishable
instead of being guessed at.
2026-09-01 12:21:41 +02:00

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Work App — Design Spec

Date: 2026-09-01 Status: Approved for implementation Type: Prototype, iterated in place

Purpose

A desktop app that is a browser for one thing only: the web tools used for work. A left nav lists those tools; clicking one shows it. Links between configured tools navigate inside the app; every other link leaves for the real browser.

It is not a general browser. There is no address bar, no tab strip, and no way to reach a site that is not on the list.

Constraints and decisions

Settled during brainstorming. Not open questions.

Decision Choice Rationale
Shell Tauri 2.11 · React 19 · Vite 7 · Tailwind 4 · TypeScript Matches FlightTube, the reference app on this machine
App rendering One child webview per app (add_child) Iframes are impossible: Google, Microsoft and most SaaS send X-Frame-Options: DENY
Sessions Persistent per-app cookie jar, plus opt-in import from a paired browser The jar is mandatory either way; the import only saves first logins
Link routing Injected JS click interceptor; permissive on_navigation A strict navigation filter breaks every OAuth redirect chain
Tab memory Every app is a live webview, hidden when inactive Keeps scroll position, drafts and timers across switches
Collapsed nav ~52px icon rail Still clickable when collapsed
Storage One apps.json in the app config dir A list of a dozen apps does not need SQLite
Platform macOS only Single webview engine, single cookie store, no cross-platform branches

Known limitations, accepted

  • Multi-webview is unstable in Tauri. The API can change between minor versions, so tauri is pinned to =2.11.5.
  • Device-bound sessions defeat cookie import. Google and Microsoft increasingly bind a session to the browser that created it. Imported cookies will sometimes be rejected and the tool asks for a real login once. The persistent jar keeps it from then on.
  • Bounds sync trails layout by a frame. A native webview is positioned from measurements the shell reports, so during a window resize it can lag. Every app in this class does.
  • The Chrome user agent is a lie. Sites that sniff deeply may behave oddly. It is on by default because Google refuses logins from anything it identifies as an embedded webview, and it is overridable per app.
  • Reading Chrome's cookies raises a Keychain prompt. Once, on pairing. That is macOS asking permission, and it is the correct behaviour.

Verified environment

Confirmed present before writing this spec:

  • rustc / cargo 1.98.0 (aarch64-apple-darwin)
  • Node v22.22.2, npm 10.9.7
  • Xcode Command Line Tools (sufficient; full Xcode not required)

Every API the design leans on was confirmed to exist in the vendored tauri 2.11.5 source: Window::add_child, Webview::{hide, show, set_bounds, bounds}, WebviewBuilder::{on_navigation, on_new_window, user_agent, initialization_script, data_store_identifier, on_page_load, on_download}, and NewWindowResponse::Deny.

Architecture

The window's own webview is the shell: React, drawing the nav, the top bar, settings and dialogs. Each configured app is a child webview stacked in a "stage" rect to the right of the nav.

┌ window ─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ┌ nav ──────┐ ┌ stage ───────────────────────────┐  │
│ │  shell    │ │  child webview (active app)      │  │
│ │  webview  │ │  ...others hidden behind it      │  │
│ └───────────┘ └──────────────────────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Child webviews are native views layered above the shell's content. They do not participate in CSS layout and they paint over anything the shell draws beneath them. Two consequences:

  • The shell reports the stage rect. A ResizeObserver on an empty <div id="stage"> sends its bounding rect to Rust in logical pixels; Rust calls set_bounds on the active webview and hide() on the others.
  • Modals hide the stage. Opening Settings hides the active app webview, or it would paint straight over the dialog.

All webviews are created at startup, but their loads are staggered: the active app first, the rest over the following seconds, so launching does not fire a dozen simultaneous page loads.

Rust modules

Module Responsibility
config.rs apps.json load, save, seed, migrate
routing.rs Pure URL → decision. No I/O, fully unit-tested
webviews.rs Child webview registry: create, show, hide, bounds, navigate
cookies/mod.rs Installed-browser detection
cookies/chrome.rs Chromium cookie DB read and v10 decryption
cookies/inject.rs WKHTTPCookieStore injection (macOS)
commands.rs The Tauri command surface
lib.rs Builder, menu bar, setup

Data model

apps.json, in the app config dir. Apps are flat with a groupId rather than nested, so dragging one between groups is a field change and not a tree rewrite.

apps[]:   { id, name, url, scope[], groupId, favicon, userAgent?, order }
groups[]: { id, name, collapsed, order }
settings: { navCollapsed, theme, pairedBrowser, lastPairedAt }

scope defaults to the URL's exact hostmail.google.com, not google.com — or Gmail and Drive would each swallow the other's links. Extra hosts are addable per app. A URL matches an app if its host equals, or is a subdomain of, a scope entry. On ambiguity the longest match wins.

An initialization_script in every app webview intercepts real user clicks and target=_blank, and decides:

Target Action
In the current app's scope Allow
A known identity provider Allow — this is what keeps SSO working
In another app's scope preventDefault(), switch to that app and navigate it
Anything else preventDefault(), hand to the default browser

The identity-provider list (accounts.google.com, login.microsoftonline.com, login.live.com, Okta, Auth0, Duo, appleid.apple.com, github.com/login, …) exists because a "Sign in with Google" button is a user click to a foreign host, and the naive rule would send it to the external browser and strand the login there.

on_navigation returns true unconditionally and only reports the URL back to the shell for the top bar. Redirects, meta-refreshes and OAuth bounces are never blocked.

on_new_window returns NewWindowResponse::Deny and re-runs the same decision in Rust, so window.open cannot escape into a stray window. A _blank link within the same app navigates that app's webview in place.

Browser pairing

Settings lists the browsers actually installed. Pairing with a Chromium browser:

  1. Copy the profile's Cookies SQLite file — Chrome holds a lock on the original — and read it with rusqlite.
  2. Read the Chrome Safe Storage key from the login Keychain, derive AES-128 with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 (salt saltysalt, 1003 iterations), and decrypt the v10 values.
  3. Keep only cookies whose domain matches a configured app's scope or the identity-provider list. Nothing else is read out of the browser.
  4. Inject them into WKHTTPCookieStore.

Verified on the machine. Pairing against Arc imported 43 cookies across 9 domains, and a probe from inside the page then read back host=example.odoo.com names=tz,cids,frontend_lang visible=3tz existing only in Arc's store, which is what proves the import landed rather than merely being handed over. setCookie is fire-and-forget, so the import's own count could never have shown this.

The sites still presented sign-in pages. That is the documented limitation, not a broken import: the cookies are in the store and visible to the page, and the session is being refused at the far end. Settings keeps the probe as Check cookies, so the same question can be answered again without guessing.

Pairing is a button, not a background job. Cookies rotate; a silent task that periodically reaches into the Keychain is worse than one the user presses when something logs them out.

UI

The design system is ported from FlightTube's ui.tsx: 30px control height, slate and sky, outline-first controls, borders for separation and shadows only for elevation, a 915px type ladder, and light and dark both designed rather than one derived from the other.

  • Nav, expanded (~240px) — traffic-light drag inset, title with cog and collapse chevron, then groups as collapsible sections with uppercase tracked labels, apps as favicon-and-name rows. The active row inverts to bg-slate-900 text-white.
  • Nav, collapsed (~52px) — favicons only, active marked with a left accent bar, name on hover, hairline dividers between groups. Still clickable, so switching does not require expanding.
  • Top bar (~38px) — back, forward, reload, the current URL muted and truncated, and open-in-browser. WKWebView's swipe-back gesture is enabled alongside it.
  • Settings — Apps, Groups, Browser pairing, Appearance.
  • First boot — an empty state offering "Add your first app" and "Pair with a browser", seeded with test apps across three groups so cross-app routing is demonstrable at once.

Testing

routing.rs and config.rs are pure and carry real unit tests: scope matching and its precedence, identity-provider passthrough, the four routing decisions, serde round-trips, and seeding. Cookie decryption is tested against a fixture database with a known key.

Webview orchestration and bounds sync have no seam that a unit test can reach. They are verified by running the app and driving it.

Notifications

WKWebView defines window.Notification, but it is inert: constructing one throws nothing and shows nothing, so a page believes it has notified you and you never hear about it. It is replaced by a shim that forwards over the same sentinel channel as everything else, and Rust raises a real macOS notification carrying the app's name.

Verified on the machine: permission: Granted · direct: raised · page: api=function shim=no was the reading that showed the native API existed and the shim had therefore never installed. The shim now replaces it unconditionally.

Service-worker push is not covered — only notifications a page raises while it is open.

Hiding elements

Anything on a page can be right-clicked and hidden. The injected script owns a stylesheet of display: none rules, re-added when a single-page app rewrites <head>. Selectors are per app and stored in apps.json, editable and reversible in Settings.

The selector generator prefers an id, then up to two stable-looking classes per level, then position — skipping classes that look hashed or numbered, because those change on every deploy. A selector that stops matching hides nothing; it never hides the wrong thing.

Out of scope

  • Windows and Linux.
  • Tabs, history, bookmarks, an address bar — it is not a general browser.
  • Per-app session isolation for multiple accounts on one service. One shared jar for now.
  • Automatic background cookie re-sync.
  • Notifications, badges and unread counts.